A large number of literature points out that Non-SOEs are faced with bank discrimination in China. This predicts that SOEs keep higher bank debt levels than Non-SOEs. However, using listed firms samples during the period 2008-2014 and control of company characteristics, we find that SOEs have significantly lower bank debt ratio in general. But government ownership indeed has advantage in access to bank debt, especially when the firms face serious financing constraints or suffer loss. On the contrary, when the firms are flush with cash and have outstanding corporate profitability, SOEs have lower bank debt ratio than Non-SOEs, which can be attributed to the management of state-owned listed firms enjoying “quiet life”. The contribution of this paper is considering both bank discrimination and management shirking hypothesis and making a more comprehensive interpretation of bank financing of SOEs from both lender and debtor’s perspective.
辛清泉，胡悦. 国有产权与上市公司银行负债：信贷歧视抑或管理卸责？[J]. 珞珈管理评论, 2017, 14(2): 49-.
Xin Qingquan,Hu Yue. Government Ownership and Bank Debt of Listed Firms: Bank Discrimination or Management Shirking?. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT RESEARCH, 2017, 14(2): 49-.